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Abstract 
 
This essay occupies a niche wedged between Philosophy and Art, exciting both the creative and inquiring 
mind. Drawing on both foundational and recent work in the philosophical study of knowledge and 
aesthetic theory, this paper synthesizes two fields within the humanities: epistemology and live theatre. 
This presentation challenges the academic barriers that keep philosophy and the performing arts from 
fully participating in interdisciplinary communication, and challenges the conceptual definition of 
knowledge itself. The aim is to promote recognition of the value in using that which is live, liminal, and 
personal in understanding the nature of knowledge. This can be achieved through exploring the ways in 
which the experiences of engaging with the fiction of live drama are a key to finding the missing element 
in the definition of knowledge. In exploring the collective views of specific, highly developed fields such 
as philosophy’s epistemology and art’s live theatre, an underutilized tool emerges: truth through fiction. 
This tool spurs the emergence of new societal and learning expectations and changes the face of 
academia in the process.  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This research paper occupies a niche, wedged between the massive, living tomes of 
Philosophy and Art. As dusty as the topic may seem, these fields are both rich and 
lively in their modern conversations, without a speck of dust in sight. The marvelous 
part of these two fields is that once one breaks through the veil of misconception and 
stigma surrounding them, they can be both accessible and satisfying to explore. Walls 
have been built up between these fields out of misplaced elitism or suspicion of the 
other, originating on both sides. Plato himself argues against the representational arts 
in the first half of Book 10 of his Republic, a work that describes the creation of the 
best society and how societies fall, saying that poetic mimesis is the imitation of 
appearance alone and its products rank far below truth, corrupting the soul, and 
should therefore be banned from the good city (Plato 602c–608b). Breaking down the 
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wall that holds these disciplines apart is a key to finding unconsidered truths and the 
answers to fundamental questions. 
 
The aim is to explore the nature of knowledge by traveling an unlikely and 
interdisciplinary path hallmarked by the creative practice of live fiction, experiencing 
action through story, and the imagination of children. Musical and instrumental 
performance, live radio, ritual practices, sport and martial art competitions, dance, 
clowning, acrobatics, and puppet theatre are fascinating kinds of live performances 
that could be explored in the context of exploring the nature of knowledge, but they 
are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper proposes that the ways in which 
audiences experience the fiction of live children’s drama is a key to finding the 
missing or mis-defined element in the epistemic definition of knowledge. We can 
begin to understand this argument by seeking the significance of its main 
components: the question of knowledge, experiences in engaging fictional worlds, the 
liminality of theatrical experience, and children’s drama.  
 
Philosophy and Epistemology 
 
The word "philosophy" comes from the Ancient Greek φιλοσοφία (philosophia), 
which literally means "love of wisdom.” In their book “Philosophy: A Beginner’s 
Guide” Teichmann and Evans define philosophy as “a study of problems which are 
ultimate, abstract and very general. These problems are concerned with the nature of 
existence, knowledge, morality, reason and human purpose,” (Teichmann & Evans 2). 
In other words, philosophy explores all that there is and attempts to creatively 
understand the way things are and the way things should be. 
 
In the first sentence of his Metaphysics, Book I, Section 1, Aristotle can be quoted: 
“πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει” or: All men by nature desire to know 
(Aristotle 1). This paper will adopt this as a basic and true premise and a hallmark of 
philosophy as a whole. The modern English word desire lacks the connotation that 
ὀρέγονται carries of being actively in the pursuit of that desired thing. Other 
translations of the word include “covet” and to “lust after.” This author contends that 
Aristotle intended the connotation of action when he chose his words and that “crave” 
would be a more apt modern translation in that it more fully captures the sense of an 
active want. 
 
It is in this craving for knowledge – this pursuit so fundamental to the wisdom-loving 
field of philosophy— that epistemology is born. In her 2009 book entitled “On 
Epistemology”, modern epistemologist Linda Zagzebski described the field as such: 
“Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowing and other ways of believing and 
attempting to find truth,” (Zagzebski 1). She further defines it as “the study of right or 
good ways to cognitively grasp reality,” (Zagzebski 8). Epistemology asks “The 
Question of Knowledge.” This Question, includes all related sub-questions, such as: 
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What is knowledge? Is knowledge possible? What does it mean to know? What makes 
something knowable? What should we know? How do we gain knowledge? These are 
the most basic questions of the field of epistemology. That which is “epistemic” is 
anything that pertains to this study of knowledge itself. Armed with fiction and live 
children’s drama, this paper will tackle only the premier question: What is knowledge? 
 
A commonly accepted three-part definition of knowledge defines it as “justified, true 
belief.” The argument is as follows: 
 
“S [a Subject] knows that p [proposition] iff [if and only if]: 
p is true 
S believes that p; 
S is justified in believing that p” (Ichikawa & Steup 1).  
 
Zagzebski says of this, “this definition was masterfully defended by Roderick 
Chisholm (1964), a leader of later twentieth-century epistemology, and this account 
of knowledge dominated epistemology for decades. Because it was part of the 
consensus until recently, it still shapes the way many epistemologists approach 
knowledge,” (Zagzebski 6). But, there is an intuitive sense that this definition, while 
agreeable, is incomplete.  
 
Most of epistemology and its theories are concerned with propositional knowledge. 
(Zagzebski 3) In philosophy, a proposition is a declarative statement which can be 
true or false. For example: “The tree’s leaves are green” and “Obama is the President 
of the United States.” Propositional knowledge is knowledge based around claims in 
the form “S knows that p”, such as: “Susie knows that the tree’s leaves are green.” 
With this in hand, we substitute “knowledge” for its first accepted definition: “Susie 
has justified and true belief that the tree’s leaves are green.” That’s acceptable, but 
the definition runs into problems when faced with claims like “Suzie knows how to 
ride a bike” or “Suzie knows Joseph.” Can both of these merely be reduced to a 
massive list of propositions about each subject? Zagzebski says that she find this sort 
of reduction “dubious”. She continues, “… I suspect that contemporary epistemology 
has suffered by ignoring understanding. I also suspect that understanding is connected 
with nonpropositional [sic] knowledge, which. . . is usually left aside in contemporary 
treatment of knowledge,” (Zagzebski 7). 
 
Let’s return to the claim “Suzie knows Joseph” and others like it: “Suzie knows 
Seattle.” It is in statements like these in which live theatre gets a foothold. An 
intuitive aspect of this kind of knowledge is that it implies some kind of invested 
personal familiarity, linked with Zagzebski’s “non-propositional understanding”. This 
aspect of invested familiarity was not obvious in Suzie’s knowledge of the green-ness 
of the tree’s leaves, if it exists there at all. Suzie’s familiarity in these cases of 
knowing is also, intuitively, the result of first-hand experience with both Joseph and 
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Seattle. These implications of experienced familiarity are a vitally important link to 
the personal “experiencial” nature of live theatre and its way of retelling fiction in a 
manner that is fully enacted. There is something more in what is being experienced in 
theatre than the fiction of a thought experiment or a novel, and more so even than 
television and movies. If the experiencing of fiction is a possible key to unlocking the 
missing or mis-defined element of knowledge, then an analysis of how audiences and 
readers engage with fictional worlds is in order. 
 
Engaging Fictional Worlds 
 
In an infamous pursuit of certainty and basic unity in all sciences through a search for 
foundational truths, 17th Century philosopher and mathematician René Descartes 
single-handedly undertook a project of methodological doubt. He attempted to 
systematically suspend his beliefs by “withholding assent” from the beliefs he found 
to be even slightly doubtful, in order to find that which was most certain. He went 
about this project by the simple means of imagining a naysayer for his views, creating 
a hypothetical scenario through which to pass his beliefs, and then suspending those 
that did not pass the test. He created an all-knowing, deceiving being called the Evil 
Genius, whose sole purpose is to deceive him in everything. Essentially, Descartes 
imagined a universe in which everything and all that he experienced was nothing but 
an illusion, much like the Matrix, except there is no “real-body” hooked up to a 
machine. The most well-known declaration that resulted from his project is cogito 
ergo sum, or I think therefore I am (Descartes 71). In other words, the only thing that 
the Evil Genius could not affect was his knowledge of his own being as a thinking 
thing, and he treated this as his first foundational truth. 
 
Descartes employed suppositional thinking in his First Meditation, containing the Evil 
Genius scenario. He “supposed” or imagined a situation to be true. In the creation of 
the character of the Evil Genius and other governing rules of the universe in which It, 
the Evil Genius, resides, Descartes created a consistent hypothetical scenario in which 
to prove his beliefs. He created a wholly hypothetical and purposeful world in which 
to ask the very real questions that had been weighing on him, very obviously 
expecting to gain real and relevant insights.  
 
There is debate about whether what Descartes did by “withholding assent” from his 
own beliefs is even possible. Zagzebski explains: “In the fifth century St. Augustine 
defined believing as thinking with assent. . . Some people use the terms ‘believe’ and 
‘know’ in a way that makes them mutually exclusive, but as long as believing is just 
thinking with assent, there is a consensus that knowing is a form of believing,” 
(Zagzebski 3) So, to say that Descartes was “withholding assent” from his beliefs 
threatens the very value of his project and profound declarations, while threatening 
the consensus of the accepted three-part definition of knowledge. It also raises 
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questions about the ability to choose our beliefs. This ability to choose our beliefs has 
been named doxastic voluntarism. 
 
Aaron Meskin, in his 2009 article called “Scrutinizing the Art of Theater”, wrote: 
“We are not free to choose our beliefs—doxastic voluntarism is false. . . On the other 
hand, a central datum recognized by contemporary theorists of pretense [sic] is that 
we are free to choose what we pretend,” (Meskin 57). It is this valuable freedom to 
step out of the current reality and our current beliefs that makes fiction so valuable to 
philosophy and quite especially so to epistemology. This theory also carries with it 
the hope of freedom found in doxastic voluntarism. According to Meskin’s claim, and 
what can be read in Descartes’ writing about the intent of his project, it can be seen 
that Descartes was not participating in doxastic voluntarism; he was merely choosing 
what to pretend for the purpose of uncovering basic truth. This theory of choice in 
pretence quashes the debate of doxastic voluntarism altogether, and opens up a new 
realm of exploration and inquiry that does not threaten the consensus of the accepted 
definition of knowledge. This is a new and significant step in the theory of 
knowledge, and is a strong step toward connecting epistemology to the realms of 
pretend play in which children engage and the theatres of children’s drama. 
 
We may not be able to choose our beliefs, but we can choose the road that gets us to 
the kinds of beliefs we want. Meskin further cites pretence theorist Shaun Nichols, 
who collected a book of essays titled, “Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays 
on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction.” It includes new essays written for the book 
from epistemologists, philosophers of the mind, cognitive psychologists, and authors 
of aesthetic theory. One of the main philosophical focuses of the book is the concept 
of the “propositional imagination.” In the introduction of this book, Nichols writes: 
“…thought experiments, modal judgment, counterfactual reasoning. All of these 
activities, so central to philosophical inquiry, involve the ‘propositional imagination’, 
the capacity we exploit when we imagine that there is an evil genius, that everyone is 
color-blind, or that Holmes had a bad habit,” (Nichols 1). It is in this exploration of 
pretence, or the act of pretending, that epistemic theorists have found a way out of the 
trappings of the Question of Knowledge and forged a strong link toward the openly 
theatrical through a study of fiction and hypothetical worlds. 
 
Hypothetical worlds are, by definition, separated from this primary reality by time, 
the characters/people that are found or not found there, the basic ruling structures of 
physics, or maybe the mere fact that the emotions employed or words used are 
external in suggestion, such as poetry. These “worlds” are separate from the primary 
reality and are thus “secondary.” Separate but related beliefs can be held within the 
context of the “secondary reality.” These can be called “secondary beliefs.” In an 
essay he wrote called “Belief and the Suspension of Disbelief”, M. H. Abrams 
describes this view by quoting and summarizing Baumgarten who coined the term 
‘aesthetics’ (the philosophical study of art and beauty). Abrams summarizes: “[A 
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work of art is] produced by a poet who is ‘like a maker or creator . . . the poem ought 
to be a sort of world,’ related to the real world ‘by analogy.’ Poetic fiction is 
‘heterocosmic,’ consisting of things possible in another world than the one we live in, 
and subject therefore not to the criterion of strict philosophic truth, but only to the 
criterion of ‘heterocosmic truth’; that is, self-consistency and the maximum of 
internal coherence,” (Abrams 6). In other words, the secondary world of a story is 
judged by how well it “holds together”. This is an interesting feature of fiction, but a 
water-tight story is not always necessary for it to be valuable. In entering these 
secondary worlds, we are challenged to look beyond our world into a secondary 
plane, which is not held to the same standard of truth, and then bring back what we 
can, through analogy. 
 
Another way to look at this multiple level system of reality is in terms of the 
“suspension of belief” and the “suspension of disbelief.” These terms are related, but 
they differ fundamentally in definition. The “suspension of belief” is synonymous 
with Descartes beginning his project of methodological doubt. The suspension of 
belief is what happens when someone willfully engages in pretending or pretence and 
begins conceiving or adopting the framework of a hypothetical or supposed scenario. 
The suspension of disbelief is a term closely associated with theatrical performance. 
It is that ability which allows us keeps the illusion of the hypothetical coherent for 
entertainment’s sake or inquiry’s sake. It is through the mental maneuvering of both 
of these separate states that healthy navigation through hypothetical worlds is 
possible. It is also what makes fiction the most excellent and already familiar ground 
to stage questions about the nature of knowledge. 
 
How do pretence and the use of secondary worlds actually function in fiction? Here is 
a delightful excerpt of a review of author Samuel Richardson, written by Denis 
Diderot in 1761: 
 
O Richardson! Despite ourselves, we take part in your books; we mix in the 
conversation; approve, blame, admire, become irritated, and get angry. How 
often I have surprised myself, like children that we take to the theatre for the 
first time, by crying out: “Don’t believe him, he is deceiving you! . . . If you go 
there, you are lost!” My soul was held in a state of perpetual agitation. How 
good it was! . . . In the space of a few hours I had undergone a vast number of 
situations, scarcely available throughout the length of the longest life 
imaginable. I heard genuine discussions about the passions; I watched self-
interest and self-esteem played and judged in a hundred different ways; I 
became the spectator for a multitude of incidents; I felt that I had acquired 
experience. (Diderot 12) [emphasis added] 
 
Diderot expresses what almost everyone has felt after reading a good book or 
watching a good movie or play: there is the feeling of having escaped into the 
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secondary world of the fiction, and coming out feeling like there has been something 
gained—something truly experienced. There is a sense of vicarious learning that takes 
place when a fiction is allowed to do its work. 
 
While knowledge can be gained vicariously through our perceived experiences with 
fictional and “secondary” worlds, it is not the act of learning knowledge and other 
facts that addresses our problem in the epistemic Question of Knowledge. The 
problem is the very nature of knowledge itself. It is not what is learned that is the key 
point here. It is the way in which it is learned from fiction that is important. It is the 
personal and active use of analogy and the imagination that makes fiction noteworthy 
in an epistemic regard, and the feeling of acquired experience that is the key to 
uncovering why “Suzie knows Joseph” is different from “Suzie knows that the tree’s 
leaves are green.” It is these pursuits within and through fiction that Aristotle’s claim 
for the common “desiring” and “craving” of knowledge comes to light. 
 
Theatre 
 
Theatre and live performance is a massively broad representational art form that has 
been with humanity since time can recall. It evolves with us and permeates almost 
every aspect of history, culture, society, and life. It is a means of disclosing and 
reflecting life and its complications in a way that is shared by all who participate. 
Speaking of theatre from a contemporary American standpoint, this paper will 
discuss the kinds of theatre performed before an audience that consist of the live 
performance of a play or devised work containing characters performed by human 
actors within a stage space. There are many other fascinating kinds of live 
performances that could be explored in the epistemic context, but they require a 
much deeper treatment of the topic. 
 
What is it about live performance and particularly theatre that makes it best suited 
for the pursuit of the Question of Knowledge? The key to the effectiveness of 
theatre’s immersive suppositional experience is that it is at its most basic levels both 
liminal and live. Liminality refers to a space, time, thing, or character that exists 
suspended between defined zones, which are often considered opposite. 
“Liminaltiy” originates from the Latin “limen” for "threshold, cross-piece, sill", or 
in broader terms, that object which exists, in purpose, between the inside and the 
outside (Harper n/p).  The experience of theatre is a threshold experience for both 
actor and audience. When one enters a theater and engages in drama, he no longer 
exists in the outside world nor is he totally a part of the world of the play. 
Liminality is what makes the theatre perfect for suppositional exploration, because 
it engages the use of metaphoric analogy and exploration. 
 
One of literature’s most profoundly liminal and beloved characters is found in J. M. 
Barrie’s Peter Pan. Within the characterization of Peter Pan himself there is much to 
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be discovered, especially in Peter’s dual nature. In Allison Kavey’s essay entitled, “I 
Do Believe in Fairies, I Do, I Do; The History and Epistemology of Peter Pan”, she 
mentions Peter’s link to his namesake and other distinctly liminal characteristics: 
 
Peter himself is a composite of bodies and characteristics borrowed from 
Pan[the Greek God], birds, fairies, and children that cannot fit into a single 
world, but fits perfectly into neither the world of the living or the dead, the 
material or the natural, the real or imagined, the human or the nonhuman 
(preternatural or animal). Because he cannot fit into existing categories, he 
straddles the worlds from which those categories derive their meanings, 
pressing hardest on the divide between the real and the imagined to create a 
space that can intrude into both places, the Neverland. (Kavey 102) 
 
Peter Pan, is one of the most essentially liminal figures in all of literature, whose life 
and world had aptly been translated to the stage by J. M. Barrie himself even before 
the publication of Peter Pan and Wendy in novel form in 1904. Placing the Neverland 
on stage is the ultimate acknowledgment of the stage itself as a liminal space, where 
the Neverland can truly live. 
 
Paul Ricoeur, in his book called “Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning”, said: “There is a triple correspondence between the body, houses, and the 
cosmos, which makes the pillars of a temple and our spinal columns symbolic of one 
another, just as there are correspondences between a roof and the skull, breath and 
wind, etc,” (Ricoeur 62). This description of a “triple correspondence” identifies the 
multilayered metaphor that theatre engages when a breathing actor walks onto a 
proscenium stage. In his fantastic book exploring the limits of theatre as metaphor, 
Bruce Wilshire asserts that “although theater is predominantly physiognomical 
communication, it is nevertheless ideal. Actual persons and things are used in the 
production, but their factual reality is bracketed out so that what they are as types and 
essences can be revealed,” (Wilshire 137). “Physiognomical communication” refers 
to the way that theatre and most arts communicate in a presentation of surfaces and 
appearances. Audience members and consumers are to infer the nature and 
characteristics of an object or person through its outward appearances. The 
significance of Wilshire’s assertion is that within theater, the “factual reality” of what 
is presented on stage can be interpreted entirely through analogy on many multiple 
levels, and much deeper truth can be revealed. To return to the ideas from M. H. 
Abram’s summarizing quote, the liminality of theater allows for the internally 
coherent “heterocosmic” truth of a fictional world to be actively “related to the real 
world ‘by analogy’” by the theatrical audience.  
 
The next important aspect after theatre’s liminality is its live nature. In addition to 
powerfully engaging Ricoeur’s “triple correspondence” in the inclusion of live breath, 
there is a distinct power and connection that lies in the viewing of that which is alive 
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and human. Consider the apparel department of your favorite department store. There 
is a very distinct and internally jarring shift that occurs in our perceptions when we 
accidentally bump into a mannequin, begin to apologize, and realize that it is but an 
object. The live nature of theatre is what distinguishes it from our experiences 
encountering the fictional in other media. There is a vast difference between watching 
Cinderella and her helpful mice on a TV in the living room and going to Disneyland 
for her autograph. It’s one thing to imagine an ageless boy who can fly using fairy 
dust, but it is quite another to watch him do it, even in the full knowledge that he is 
being shown to us through the skills of what is usually a slight female actress in a 
harness and talented fly crew. It is in the live nature of theatre that the strength and 
import of the “analogy” of the secondary, fictional world is supported. 
 
Children’s Drama 
 
A beautiful sub-category of this kind of theatre is children’s drama. Historically, it 
has been seen as an inferior form to “real” “adult” theatre. Think of children’s theatre 
as a caricaturized version of other standard modern theatre. This does not mean it is 
meant only for humor or entertainment, or that it is somehow a degenerate and 
unworthy version—it skillfully takes the things that theatre is and amplifies them, and 
diminishes the things that it isn’t along with some subtler aspects of the form. This 
makes the elusive aspects of liminality and live enactment more obvious in children’s 
drama in some ways and more subtle in others. In children’s drama, the analogical 
framework is often simplified for easier consumption. The morals are clearer, 
characters are “bigger”, and the limitations of the stage space is often pushed and 
altered for the audience’s more attentive inclusion in the secondary world. For 
example, it becomes more common for characters to directly address the audience in 
children’s drama. On the other hand, the recognition of other human beings in live 
enactment might decrease. Actors are often more obscured by costume, makeup, color 
and spectacle. The inclusion of other live performance such as puppets, dance, and 
clowning also contributes heavily to a possible sense of diminishing “purity” in the 
form. If skillfully employed however, these features only enhance the telling of the 
fictional world. 
 
In his review of Richardson, Diderot also mentions his “crying out” to fictional 
characters “like children that we take to the theatre for the first time.” As Diderot 
confesses, these participatory impulses are not confined to children, though it is in 
children that audience reactions are less regulated by societal codes of behavior. The 
study of the imaginary and how humans imagine quite immediately falls to the study 
of children and how they play and learn. Not only do children have more outwardly 
observable reactions to fiction and theatre, the study of children’s pretence tells about 
the development and basic structures of the human imagination. If study can find the 
“architecture of imagination,” as theorist Shaun Nichols called it, then exploring and 
utilizing the structure will become much more targeted and effective.  
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Encouraging a suspension of disbelief in a theatrical production should never be 
about trying to “fool” the audience, especially children. It is ill-use of imagination’s 
structure, and is not nearly as effective in teaching or inspiring inquiry. It is the dual 
knowledge and correspondence of both reality and the fictional reality that makes live 
theatre a particularly powerful and apt tool for greater understanding of the nature and 
definition of knowledge. It is the encouraged use of this correspondence, through the 
personal and active use of analogy, the use of the child-like imagination, and the 
feeling of gained understanding through the feeling of acquired experience that makes 
children’s theatre the premier form of live theatre, and the premier vehicle for new 
epistemic exploration. 
 
In the task of analyzing the personal use of analogy and the imagination, the only 
illustrating examples that can be used are personal ones, as there is no other way to 
truly describe the experience of theater and the relevant thoughts that arise from such 
an experience than from a subjective point of view. For this author, it is a vivid 
childhood memory of seeing a theatrical production of Charlotte’s Web that 
exemplifies the use of liminality, live performance, and personal analogical 
imagination in children’s drama. 
 
The audience saw that Charlotte’s costume was designed in such a way that when 
she had scenes in which she spoke to Wilber and other animals such as Templeton 
the rat, the actress stood at full height in a spider costume, but when Charlotte was 
on her web while Fern and other humans were present, the actress went behind a 
pillar or a section of her web and crossed her costumed hands. Her gloves mimicked 
the rest of her costume in coloring and design, creating, for the view of the 
audience, a miniature Charlotte. 
 
Even as a child, this author found it to be phenomenally clever. She remembers the 
delightful wash of comprehension as she understood the symbolic representation of 
what had happened. At the time, she knew that Charlotte was being played by a 
human woman, but also knew by her costume and the content of the play’s universe 
that Charlotte was a spider. This author also knew that as a spider, Charlotte was not 
in fact changing size. The size change was merely the audience’s forced perspective 
of her in differing scenes. Charlotte’s transformation was like a film actor’s “close-
up.” It wasn’t until later, after some theatrical and director’s theory, that this author 
uncovered the complexity of the illustration showing a very literal difference in how 
Fern and the other human characters perceived Charlotte and how Wilber saw her. 
Even in a child’s understanding, this author had allowed her beliefs about the sizes of 
people and the sizes of spiders and her disbelief at the size-morphing ability of either 
to all be suspended, and a greater truth and essence was revealed. The live nature of 
the human playing Charlotte was key in the recognition and appreciation of what had 
been seen. 
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All of the elements this paper has discussed were present in that theatrical experience. 
This is a powerful but typical experience for imaginative children when exposed a 
well-told story through theatre. The access to multi-level understandings through the 
experience of encountering living, representational reality is exactly the mode in 
which epistemology should now address the problem of defining the missing element 
of the definition of knowledge. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper looked to theatre to challenge the Question of Knowledge, and sought to 
understand the ways in which the experiences of engaging the fiction of live drama is a 
key to finding the missing element in the definition of knowledge. These experiences 
included the involvement of suppositional thinking and the interactive engagement with 
other people and live events. Theatre fulfills this in its essence through its liminality 
and live nature. In exploring ways in which the fictional can be navigated, through the 
suspensions of belief and disbelief and the use of analogy to access the “types and 
essences” displayed, we discovered ways in which epistemology is already reaching out 
to theatre. It is, indeed, the use of the personal and active analogy, the use of the child-
like imagination, and the feeling of gained understanding through the feeling of 
acquired experience that makes children’s theatre the premier form of live theatre. 
Children’s drama epitomizes the use of theatre as it should be used in epistemic 
exploration, and has yet to be explored in depth, in spite of the mounting research 
connecting pretend play and children’s development to epistemic advancement and the 
pursuit of a complete definition of knowledge.  
 
This research excites both the creative and scientific mind, bridging chasms that have 
stood between these fields since they divided. A collaborative conversation is finally 
beginning to emerge. It’s time that the specializations that have arisen turn back and 
collaborate for the answers they seek. In exploring the collective views of specific, 
highly developed fields such as philosophy’s epistemology and art’s children’s 
drama, unconsidered truths can emerge. Doing so, in this case, gives epistemology 
more tools to resolve a question that has plagued epistemology since its creation. It 
also creates the opportunity for drama to become more central to education and 
learning and more fully fulfill its potential to teach. In recognizing the uses of that 
which is live, liminal, and personal in the nature of knowledge, new societal and 
teaching expectations emerge, changing the face of academia in the process. This 
paper proposes a reevaluation of the misplaced elitisms and suspicions that exists 
between analytic and formulated academic spheres, and the realms of learning and 
creativity in the arts. 
 
Limiting the uses of fiction limits the quality of knowledge, and locks down the types 
of knowledge available to humanity as common philosophers. The disparity between 
fiction or poetry and philosophy has been present since philosophy’s creation. This is 
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damaging to our understanding of the nature of knowledge. A drastic epistemic re-
evaluation of the value of fiction and most especially theatre is in order. I find this 
topic to be both modern and relevant, not just to the philosopher or artist, but to the 
greater understanding of what can be known and how we can know it. Society 
changes when creativity and inquiry are prized. 
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